Journal of Intellectual Property Law
Volume 10
Issue 2 Symposium: Articles in Honor of
Professor L. Ray Patterson

Article 10

March 2003

When California Dreamin' Becomes a Hollywood Nightmare;
Copyright Infringement and the Motion Picture Screenplay:
Toward an Improved Framework
Nick Gladden

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Nick Gladden, When California Dreamin' Becomes a Hollywood Nightmare; Copyright Infringement and the
Motion Picture Screenplay: Toward an Improved Framework, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 359 (2003).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol10/iss2/10

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Intellectual Property Law by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more
information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

Gladden: When California Dreamin' Becomes a Hollywood Nightmare; Copyright

NOTES

WHEN CALIFORNIA DREAMIN' BECOMES A
HOLLYWOOD NIGHTMARE; COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT AND THE MOTION PICTURE
SCREENPLAY: TOWARD AN IMPROVED
FRAMEWORK
I. INTRODUCTION

Movie mogul Samuel Goldwyn once famously referred to screenwriters as
"schmucks with Underwoods."'
Underpaid and under appreciated, the
screenwriter traditionally occupied the lowest rung on Hollywood's ladder.
Today, the tables have turned dramatically. In 1993, "Lethal Weapon" scribe
Shane Black received four million dollars for his screenplay "The Long Kiss
Goodnight."2 This ushered in a virtual Gilded Age for Hollywood screenwriters.
Million dollar script sales have become as routine as Robert DowneyJr.'s latest
trip to rehab. With more fame, wealth, and creative input than ever before,
screenwriters are finally getting the respect that they deserve. As movies become
exponentially more expensive to make, studios realize the screenplay is a blueprint
for a multi-million dollar investment.
With the lure of instant fame and riches, the aspiring screenwriter is just as
likely to be found in Poughkeepsie as he is a Hollywood back lot. It should not
be surprising then that a cottage industry of how-to-sell-a-screenplay books,
conferences, and web-sites has sprung up in recent years.' For those who live
outside of Hollywood, the Internet in particular is viewed as an important tool to
level the playing field for new writers in search of success.4 As Hollywood is
flooded with more and more scripts, one unifying principle seems to unite all
aspiring screenwriters: an overwhelming fear of getting ripped off.

I WHY

WE WRITE: PERSONAL STATEMENTS AND PHOTOGRAPHIC PORTRAITS OF 25 ToP

SCREENwRrrERS 13 (Lorian Elbert ed., 1999).

2 THOM TAYLOR, THE BIG DEAL 7 (1999).

3 See Kyle Creason, HolwodAkhemy, at http://www.scriptnotes.com/Interview2.htm (last
visited Apr. 7,2003).
4 CHRISTOPHER WEHNER, SCREENWRITING ON THE INTERNET 1 (2001).
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While a large number of Hollywood movies get sued every year for copyright
infringement, the overwhelming percentage of these suits fail. Most often, writers
are just unwilling to admit that two people can come up with the same idea. One
Midwestern judge is said to have found, "as a matter of triable fact, that there are
only twenty-nine basic plot ideas in the world."' Generally speaking, it is much
cheaper for a studio to buy a script than to steal one.6 That being said, infringement does occur. New writers in particular are vulnerable to infringement
because they have to be less discriminating about to whom they send their
scripts.' Even though a writer may justifiably believe that his script has been
stolen, proving that in a court of law can be a difficult challenge.
For a screenwriter to prove copyright infringement, he must show copyright
ownership, the defendant's access to his work, and substantial similarity.8
Copyright ownership is a "statutory formality easily satisfied prior to the
institution of litigation."9 Generally, access is shown if the defendant had a
reasonable opportunity to view the plaintiff's work.'0 However, courts often take
an unrealistically stringent view as to what constitutes reasonableness. The ease
with which scripts can be disseminated over the Internet is likely to complicate
this problem even more. Substantial similarity is the meat and potatoes of any
copyright litigation. Unfortunately, the substantial similarity standard for motion
picture screenplays has been somewhat underdeveloped. While courts have
defined a number of concrete elements to compare," little effort has been made
to analyze how courts should go about applying those elements. The view being
that decisions of substantial similarity "must inevitably be made ad hoc."' 2 While

5 See RON SUPPA, THE BuSINESS OF SCREENWRITING 66 (1999).
6

See Melody Jackson,in~gngAllthe Wry to the Bank, A Real-Lifi Screenarter's$19,000,000 Stoy,

CREATIVE SCREENwITING, March/April 2002, at 12 (discussing a recent judgment of nineteen
million dollars entered on behalf of Brian Webster, a Michigan high school teacher, against 20th
Century Fox). A jury found Webster's screenplay "Could This Be Christmas" had been infringed
upon by the Arnold Schwarzenegger flop "Jingle All the Way." The judgment was equal to about
one-third of what it cost to produce the film. Id
SSee David Walter, Promote andProtect: How to Safeguard Your Creative Work From Theft, athttp://
www.entertainmentcareers.net/qa/write/protection.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
' See Koufv. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042,1044 n.2, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1877 (9th Cir. 1994).
" Stephanie J. Jones, Music Copyrght in Theoty and Practice: An ImprovedApproachforDetermining
SubstantialSimilian', 31 DUQ. L. REv. 277, 277 (1993).
" See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,1172,196
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97 (9th Cir. 1977).
n See Kouf,16 F.3d at 1045 (defining the elements as plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace,
characters, and sequence of events).
12 Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1516 (9th Cir. 1990).
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it is certainly true that each case shall rest on its own merits, clear patterns have
emerged within the major elements as to what constitutes substantial similarity.
This Note will provide a comprehensive examination of copyright infringement in the area of motion picture screenplays. It will look at the history of
protection for motion picture screenplays, examine the varying standards for
access and argue for a lessening of the standard, and analyze the major elements
of a screenplay used to determine substantial similarity, including character, plot,
mood, and theme. Finally, this Note will suggest an improved framework for
each element and hopefully will bring more structure to screenplay litigation.
II. BACKGROUND
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to enact
copyright legislation in order to promote and protect the writings of authors."
Without such protection, authors would be denied the fruits of their labor and
have little incentive to create. A motion picture screenplay is a "writing" within
the meaning of the Copyright Clause, although it does have a unique facet to it."
In the seminal case of Baker v. Selden, 5 the Supreme Court interpreted the
Copyright Clause to mean that only expression of ideas and not the ideas
themselves could be copyrighted. 6 Baker involved a book which explained a
method of accounting and included blank forms to illustrate that method. 7 The
original author sued the defendant when he published a book that included forms
to be used with the plaintiff's system.' In a landmark decision, the Supreme
Court held that if a copyrighted work describes a system or process, copyright
does not stop others from making whatever printed works are needed to use that
system. 9 This gave rise to the so-called idea/expression dichotomy which was
later codified in the Copyright Act of 1976.0 It can hardly be disputed that

13 "The Congress shall have power... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,

by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
'" Unlike a novel, a motion picture is a highly collaborative process. This has led some scholars
to believe that a screenplay is better considered a "joint work" as defined by the 1976 Copyright Act.
Coauthors to the joint work might include the director, producer, and performers. See F. Jay
Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorshb of Motion Picturts Under U.S. Copyright Law,
49 UCLA L. REv. 225,287-88 (2001).
'5 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
16 Id.
17 Id
at 100.
S Iu
'9 WILLIAM S. STRONG, THE COPYRIGHT BOOK 15 (4th ed. 1993).
0 "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea... regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
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denying monopoly rights in ideas is critical to creating competition in the
marketplace and encouraging others to create new works. Unfortunately, the line
between idea and expression is not always a clear one. One of the first major
cases to shed light on that subject was Nichols v. UniversalPictures Corporation.2
Writing for the Second Circuit,Judge Hand articulated the famous "abstractions"
test for determining when the line has been crossed between idea and expression.
Judge Hand said:
Upon any work . . . a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is
left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general
statement of what the [work] is about, and at times might consist
only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions
where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the [author]
could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their
expression, his property is never extended. 2
In Nichols, the plaintiff had written a play entitled "Abie's Irish Rose" about
a taboo romance between a Jewish boy and a Catholic girl.' Knowing that their
deeply religious fathers strongly disapprove of interfaith dating, the couple
conceal the truth by duping the Irish father into believing the boy is Catholic and
the Jewish father into believing the girl is Jewish.24 The ruse is eventually
discovered, and the fathers disown their children.'h When the couple later gives
birth to twins, the families reconcile.26 The defendant produced a film called
"The Cohens and the Kellys."' The kids of an Irish andJewish family living next
door to each other fall in love and secretly get married.'
While initially
disapproving of the union, the feuding fathers of the couple eventually discover
they are related when they jointly inherit a fortune from a distant relative.'
Comparing the two works, Judge Hand found that "[a] comedy based upon
conflicts between Irish andJews, into which the marriage of their children enters,
is no more susceptible of copyright than the outline of Romeo and Juliet" and

work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
21 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
22 Id at 121.
2

Id at 120.

24 Id
25 Id

' Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1930).
27 Id
28 id
2

Id at 121.
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"[t]hough the plaintiff discovered the vein, she could not keep it to herself.""0
Hand determined that any similarities between the works were too abstract to
deserve protection.
Nicholis important because it represented the federal courts' first acknowledgment of the idea/expression dichotomy in copyright infringement suits.3 In
Nichols, the court also rejected the testimony of a plaintiff's expert who prepared
an elaborate analysis of each character's emotional arc. 2 Instead, Hand
enunciated an "ordinary observer" test whereby a fact finder would "stand upon
the firmer, if more naive, ground of its considered impressions upon its own
perusal."33
The Second Circuit refined Hand's abstractions test in Arnstein v. Porter.
Amstein alleged that the defendant, musician Cole Porter, had infringed upon
songs written by Amstein.'
The court created a two-prong test to show
infringement. First, the court examined access and similarity to determine if
copying had occurred. An inference of copying could be created if the defendant
had access to the plaintiff's work and the works were similar.3 Expert testimony
and analysis would be allowed to help the trier of fact determine copying. 6 Even
if copying is established, that is not adequate enough to show infringement. The
copying must go so far as to constitute "improper appropriation."37 The second
prong of the Arnstein test then turns on whether the ordinary layperson would
find illicit copying. 8 This is shown if the defendant "took from [the] plaintiff's
works so much of what is pleasing to the [eyes and] ears of lay [persons], who
comprise the audience for whom such popular [works are] composed, that
defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff."39
This second prong was largely a reiteration of the ordinary observer test set forth
in NichoLr.
By distinguishing copying from illicit copying/improper appropriation, the
Second Circuit created a standard whereby a defendant may have copied from the
plaintiff's text, even to a degree where the works are substantially similar, but the
material taken may be ineligible for copyright protection.' If the material taken

0 Id at 122.
Jones, supra note 9, at 284.
32 N/€/ol/, 45 F.2d at 123.
33 Id
3' Amstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464,469, 68 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 288,291 (2d Cif. 1946).
31

1s Id at 468.
36

Id

31 Id "Improper appropriation" would later be recast as the phrase "substantial similarity."
38 Id
39 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.
40

See Douglas Y'Barbo, The Oriin of the Contemporay Standardfor Copyright Infingement, 6 J.
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is an unprotectable idea or element, the degree of similarity is irrelevant. By
adopting a bifurcated approach that required both copying and improper
appropriation, the court implicitly reiterated the idea/expression dichotomy and
set the stage for the Ninth Circuit's influential decision in Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Productions,Inc. v. McDonald' Corporation.'"
The Kroft decision is important for a number of reasons. First, the 9th Circuit
includes California, where the majority of screenplay infringement suits are filed.
Second, it was the Kroffi decision that first fully "synthesized the elements of a
copyright action and fully articulated the distinctions between similarity in idea
and expression."42 Third, other jurisdictions have used Kroffl as a starting point
in developing their own standards for substantial similarity.
Sid and Marty Krofft were the creators of "H.R. Pufnstuf," a hit children's
show about a young boy who lived in a fantasyland inhabited by colorful
costumed characters, moving trees, and talking books.43 The success of the show
led to a wide variety of H.R. Pufnstuf products and endorsements.'
In early 1970, a McDonald's advertising firm approached the Kroffts about
teaming up for an ad campaign that would feature the H.R. Pufnstuf characters4 s
When negotiations broke down, McDonald's went ahead with their
"McDonaldland" project, using characters very similar to those in H.R.
Pufnstuf." McDonald's hired former Krofft employees to design and construct
the costumes, and employed the same voice expert who supplied all the voices for
the Pufnstuf characters.47 Before the McDonaldland ads, plaintiffs had licensed
the use of H.R. Pufnstuf characters to manufacturers of toys, games, lunch boxes,
cereals, and even the Ice Capades.4" After the McDonaldland campaign, which
also included the distribution of toys and games, the plaintiffs efforts to enter

INTELL. PROP.L. 285, 304-05 (1999).
41

Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 196

U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 97 (9th Cir. 1977).

42 DOROTHYJ. HOWELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIMS AND THE PROTECTION OF FICTIONAL

CHARACTERS 30 (1990).
41 Kruffi, 562 F.2d at 1161. The Kroffts were also the team behind "The Banana Splits."
44

1Id

45

Id

4 Id Those characters included luminaries like Mayor McCheese, Grimace, and Hamburglar.
47 Id
48

Kroffl, 562 F.2d at 1161-62.
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into new licensing agreements or extend existing ones proved unsuccessful.49 The
Kroffts eventually brought suit against McDonald's for copyright infringement.
In deciding the case, the Ninth Circuit explicitly stated what the Arnstein court
had alluded to by requiring that both substantial similarity in ideas and expression
be shown. The first prong of the test is an extrinsic test because it objectively
considers similarity of ideas."0 It depends not upon the trier of fact, "but on
specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed.""1 Because it is an extrinsic test,
expert testimony and analysis are appropriate.5 " If the first step is satisfied, the
plaintiff must still show substantial similarity of the expression of the idea. This
step involves an intrinsic test whereby an ordinary, reasonable observer
subjectively compares the two works to determine if they are substantially
similar." In Krofft, McDonald's argued that the court should only apply an
extrinsic test, pointing to specific differences in its characters and settings that
evidenced a lack of substantial similarity.' For example, while Mayor McCheese
wore a typical diplomat's sash, Pufnstuf sported a cummerbund from which
hangs a medal inscribed "mayor." 5 If only an extrinsic test were employed,
McDonald's laundry list of minute dissimilarities might have gotten them off the
hook. However, the court wisely understood that such an analytic analysis does
not occur in a vacuum. The characters cannot be removed from the setting and
context in which they operate. As Judge Hand stated, copyright "cannot be
limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial
variations. '" s6 The correct intrinsic approach, showing McDonaldland's impact
on the minds and imaginations of kids, revealed that the defendants had captured
the total concept and feel of H.R. Pufnstuf. 7
Starting in the early 1980s, a line of cases tried to define an "idea" for the
purpose of employing the Krfft test. 8 In the literary setting, courts "defined [an]
idea as 'plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence' [of

49 Id at 1162. The H.R. Pufnstuf characters were actually booted from the Ice Capades in favor
of the McDonaldland characters. At trial, the evidence showed that certain persons with whom the
plaintiffs dealt for licensing mistakenly believed that the H.R. Pufnstuf characters were being licensed
to McDonald's for the McDonaldland campaign. Consequently, these potential licensees did not
pursue licensing agreements for the characters themselves. Id at n.3.
s Id at 1164.
51 Id (listing those elements as "the type of artwork involved, the materials used, the subject
matter, and the setting for the subject").
s2

Id

s1 Krfl, 562 F.2d at 1164.
s4 Id at 1166.
55

Id

Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1930).
'7 See HOWELL, supra note 42, at 31.
58 Jones, supranote 9, at 292.
56
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events].,"' Since it grew to include almost every element that may be considered
concrete in a literary work, "the extrinsic test as applied to books, scripts, plays,
and motion pictures can no longer be seen as a test for mere similarity of ideas."'
By including all objective manifestations of creativity, the two-prong Krofft test is
now more aptly described as "objective and subjective analyses of expression,
having strayed from Krff's division between expression and ideas." 61 The
intrinsic test remains unchanged. It is still based upon the trier of fact's subjective
determination of whether the total concept and feel of the two works are
substantially similar.
The idea/expression dichotomy is responsible for a majority of the confusion
in screenplay litigation. Most writers do not understand that much of a screenplay
is likely comprised of unprotectable elements. Krfftprovides a general framework
to sort out the protectable from the unprotectable. While courts have rightly
refused to draw bright lines as to what cons titutes screenplay substantial similarity,
clear trends have emerged, particularly within the elements of character, plot,
mood, and theme. Of course, before the court can even get to substantial
similarity, the plaintiff must clear the access hurdle. While not as sexy and
important as its substantial similarity counterpart, it remains a significant
impediment in screenplay infringement suits.
III. ACCESS
Direct evidence of copying is rarely available. 62 Most people are smart enough
not to admit to copying or let someone else observe them doing it. Consequently,
the access element is usually shown through circumstantial evidence. Access will
be proved "if the plaintiff's copyrighted work was available to the public or if it
was specifically available to the defendant."63
Common sense tells us that you cannot copy something unless you are
acquainted with it. Generally, courts require a reasonable possibility, not a mere
possibility, that the infringer saw the plaintiff's work.' Since the average script
being peddled around town is not available to the general public (via bookstore,
library, etc.), a plaintiff must show a chain or link of events by which the
defendant could have viewed it.6" Cases where the plaintiff has directly given the

9 Idat 293.
' Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990).
61 Id
62 See ,genera4lyMARGRETH BARRET, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-PATENT, TRADEMARKS,

&

COPYRIGHTS 212 (3d ed. 2000).
63 id

See Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 582, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1785 (4th Cir. 1996).
s See Cox v. Abrams, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6687, *9 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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script to an infringer are not the most common scenario. More likely is the
situation where an author sends a script to a third party, who then passes it along
to the defendant. Where the intermediary has a close relationship with the alleged
infringer, courts often infer a reasonable possibility of access." Unfortunately,
many courts set an unrealistically high bar as to what constitutes a "close
relationship." In Tow/er v. Say es, Virginia Towler submitted a copy of her
screenplay "Crossed Wires" to SCS Films, a successor company to Cinecom,
which had previously released two of writer/directorJohn Sayles' films. 7 Towler
spoke with a representative of the company, who Towler said agreed to forward
a copy of the script to Sayles." Crediting Towler's testimony that SCS said it
69
would forward the script to Sayles, the court still found no evidence of access.
Sayles, not surprisingly, denied receiving the script and the court found "no
evidence upon which a jury could base an inference that Sayles was not
truthful."7 Cinecom, SCS's predecessor, was a small, independent film company
that produced two of Sayles' critically acclaimed films. Clearly Sayles had a good
working relationship with Cinecom or he would not have released a second film
with them.
Moreover, Cinecom and SCS shared the same chairman, were located in the
same office, and employed most of the same employees.71 Furthermore, Sayles'
own business attorney was a former Cinecom employee.72 Despite those ties, the
court held that the dealings between SCS and Sayles "must involve some overlap
in subject matter to permit an inference of access."73 Presumably there was
insufficient overlap because SCS had no interest in developing "Crossed Wires"
itself or was not working with Sayles on any projects at that time. The court's
rationale seems to confuse a reasonable chance to view the work with an actual
chance to do so. It seems reasonable that either Strain or someone whom Sayles
had dealt with at Cinecom would have forwarded the script to him, given his past
relationship with the company, Towler's specific request to do so, and her
credited testimony that Strain agreed to pass the script along. At the very least,

6See
Tow/er, 76 F.3d at 583 (giving examples of court cited close relationships include working
in the same department with the infringer or someone who regularly contributes creative ideas to

him).
6IId at 582.

The SCS representative, Tracy Strain, did not recall the conversation asking her to forward
the script to Sayles. However, no one disputes that SCS did actually receive a copy of "Crossed
Wires" from Towler. Id
69 Id at 583.
70

Tower, 76 F.3d at 583.

Ild at 582.
at 583.
Id (quoting Meta-Film Associates, Inc. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346, 1358,222 U.S.P.Q.

72 Id
73

(BNA) 211 (C.D. Cal. 1984)).
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the reasonableness of access question was one for a jury to decide and should not
have been decided as a matter of law.
Ironically, another badly decided access case is an Eleventh Circuit decision
also involving Sayles. In Henog v.Castle Rock Entertainment,a Miami high school
teacher accused Sayles of infringing upon her script "Concealed" with his Oscar
nominated screenplay "Lonestar."74 As part of her master's thesis in film studies
at the University of Miami, Herzog had to write a feature length screenplay.7 She
gave a copy of her script to William Cosford, the esteemed film critic for the
"Miami Herald," and asked him to serve on her thesis committee." While
declining to serve because of time constraints, Cosford kept the copy of
"Concealed." ' It was Herzog's belief that Cosford gave "Concealed" to Sayles
when he attended the Miami Film Festival in 1993.78 Sayles had attended the
Miami Film festival the previous two years and dined with Cosford on both
occasions.79 There was even evidence to suggest that Sayles stayed at Cosford's
house during the 1992 festival.80 While no one specifically remembered Cosford
and Sayles interacting during the 1993 Miami Film Festival,"1 it is reasonable to
believe they did. The two enjoyed a social relationship and spent time together
at the previous two festivals. Even assuming they did interact in 1993, the court
did not view their relationship as the kind where Cosford would have given a
script to Sayles. The court remarked that Cosford "was a respected film critic, not
a conduit for the film industry." 2 The court's statement actually disproves its
point. As a film critic, Cos ford was not someone who would produce or finance
a film. He did not interact with studio heads or agents. The only thing he really
could do with the script to help further Herzog's dream was to pass it along to
someone in the film industry. Having received the script soon before the 1993
Miami Film Festival, it was reasonable for that person to have been Sayles. Sayles
was a savvy film veteran. He might have been interested in purchasing the script
to either rewrite it or direct it. Even if he was not interested in the screenplay for
himself, Sayles could have easily passed it along to his agent or someone else in
the business who might want to buy it from Herzog.

7 Herzog v. Castle Rock Entn't, 193 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir. 1999).
75 u
76 1d

77 Id

78 Id at 1245. Cosford died in 1994 and therefore could not be deposed for the subsequent
lawsuit.
79Heq g, 193 F.3d at 1253.
90 Id at 1252.
81Id at 1249-50.
82Id at 1251.
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The Towlerand Hertogcases are indicative of how far some courts have strayed
from the real issue at stake: whether the defendant copied the plaintiff's work.
While it would be unfair to dismiss access as a mere technicality, it should not be
employed as a brutish bouncer preventing entrance into the more substantive club
of substantial similarity. Most courts are quick to state that "no amount... of
access will suffice to show copying if there are no similarities." 3 Furthermore, a
majority of circuits dispense with the access requirement altogether if the two
works are so strikingly similar as to preclude independent creation." Consequently, if the absence or presence of access is not determinative to courts in
these kinds of lawsuits, access should hardly be considered a critical bar to
victory."
The access problem will likely be further complicated by the ever increasing
role of the Internet in screenwriting. In 2000, Matt Damon and Ben Affleck
produced the online screenplay contest Project Greenlight. Over ten-thousand
screenwriters submitted scripts online with the winner receiving one million
dollars from Miramax Films to make their movie.8 6 There are numerous other
web-sites where scripts are posted and available for the general public to read and
review. Furthermore, many producers and agents let aspiring screenwriters e-mail
them directly a copy of their screenplay.
Presently, most courts accept a theory of access based upon the plaintiff's
work being widely available to the public.8 7 Since the work is widely disseminated,
there is a much greater likelihood that the defendant was actually exposed to it or
had a reasonable opportunity to be so exposed."
This theory of access has
generally been inapplicable in the screenplay context because unproduced
screenplays are not widely available to the public like a novel or television show
are. However, this is no longer the case. Once a script enters cyber-space, the
screenwriter loses all control over his work. With the click of a mouse, a script
can be sent to a worldwide audience numbering in the millions. Scripts posted
and passed around on the Internet are just as accessible as the more common
cases of wide dissemination, including a song played on the radio or a novel sold
in bookstores. Adopting a theory of wide dissemination based on Internet access
will not give plaintiffs a free ride. They will still have the burden of showing that
their work was widely disseminated, a claim which can be refuted by evidence

Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990).
See Hqog, 193 F.3d at 1248.
s See Karen Bevill, Copyright Infringement and Access: Has the Access Requirement Last its Probative
Value?, 52 RUTGERS L. REv. 311, 325 (1999).
83
8

' ContestOverview, at http: //www.projectgreeght.5veplanet.com/contests/pgl2/overview.jsp
(last visited Oct. 7, 2002).
87 See BARETT, supra note 62, at 212.

88See Bevill, supra note 85, at 326.
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showing that the site was not widely known or used. At the end of the day, courts
cannot remain complacent in the face of changing technology and changing times.
A more encompassing standard of access will let courts get back to their real
business: comparing the concrete, expressive elements of a screenplay in a search
for substantial similarity.
IV. CHARACIER

Substantial similarity in characters can be analyzed in one of two ways. First,
a plaintiff might seek copyright protection for the character apart from the
specific plot in which they appear.8 9 This is usually reserved for strong brand
names like the Lone Ranger or Bugs Bunny. According to Judge Learned Hand,
a character had to be sufficiently developed to be protected independently of a
story's overall plot."° The Ninth Circuit took things a step further in a case
involving hard-boiled author Dashiell Hammett. Hammett sold the rights to the
"Maltese Falcon" to Warner Brothers, but continued to write stories using the
Sam Spade character. 9 Warner Brothers sued, claiming infringement. 2 Although
finding that Hammett had contractually maintained his rights to use Sam Spade,
the court went on to state that characters were uncopyrightable unless a character
itself is the story. 3 This is a very exacting standard, as the vast majority of
characters are mere vessels to move a plot along. It should be noted, however,
that courts have found literary infringement through character comparisons, thus
suggesting that characters are protected by copyright. 9'
With regards to film and television scripts, a second type of character analysis
is normally used. In these cases, plaintiffs are not claiming independent copyright
protection for a character, but use character as one element of comparison to
show theft of an overall work. Once again, this analysis turns on the
idea/expression dichotomy. General concepts and ideas associated with a
character are uncopyrightable, but the specific expression of those ideas is
copyrightable.95
For instance, in Zambito v. ParamountPictures Corporation,the plaintiff claimed
that "Raiders of the Lost Ark" was ripped off from his archaeologist/treasure

89 Siu ROBERT E. LEE, A COPYRIGHT GUIDE FOR AUTHORS 134 (1995).

90See

id

91STRONG, smra note 19, at 23.
92 Id
93 Id
94 Id

at 24.

5 Id at 135.
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hunter script "Black Rainbow.""6 In comparing the plaintiff's protagonist, Zeke
Bannaro, to Indiana Jones, the court stated that:
Zeke is basically a serious, self-interested, individual who betrays
both the museum for which he works and his illegitimate 'backer,'
strikes out on his own, and [kills] his adversaries in cold-blood.
Indy, on the other hand, is a larger-than-life adventurer who, in
matinee-idol fashion,
remains loyal to truth, justice and the
97
American way.
Besides, the fact that the two were male archaeologists searching for treasure,
they had nothing in common.
Likewise, in Olson v. National Broadcasting Company, Inc., the court found no
substantial similarity among the characters in the Stephen J. Cannell 8 created
series the "A-Team" and the plaintiff's treatment for an action television show
entitled "Cargo." 99 While both shows were centered around Vietnam veterans
engaged in comedic action-adventures, the court quickly dismissed any similarity
in overall plot, dialogue, or setting."° Similarities in mood and pace were found
to be common to the genre of an action-adventure television series."' 1 The
12
plaintiff's most viable argument involved substantial similarity in character.
Olson had not even written an actual script. He wrote a brief summary of his
concept, which included only a three to four line description of each character and
his wish list of the actor to play that character."03 While the court allowed for the
finding of some loose correspondence among the characters, it held that because
the "Cargo" characters were so thinly drawn and because the "A-Team"
characters differed in significant ways, substantial similarity was not present."'
The court stated that "[t]he less developed the characters, the less they can be
copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too
indistinctly."'0 5 Looking back on the suit, Cannell holds no animus toward Olson.
96 Zambito v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 613 F. Supp. 1107, 1108, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 649

(E.D.N.Y. 1985).
91 Id at 1111.
9' CanneU is the creative force behind such hits as 'The Rockford Files," "The A-Team,"
"Hunter," and the "Commish."
" Olson v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446,1447-48,8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1231 (9th Cir. 1988).
'00 Id at 1450.
lot Id at 1451.
102 Id
103 Id at 1449 (describing one of the characters simply as a "militaristic, extremist, schizoid
Southerner").
1040lson, 855 F.2d at 1453.
105 Id at 1452.
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"I think Ernest really thought I or NBC had stolen from him. He was not a guy
in the business and didn't understand how closely ideas just come together
naturally. At the end of the day, the only thing the two shows shared was some
sort of quasi-military theme."' 6 Cannell added that "I think it's absolutely
criminal to steal someone else's ideas. Plus, I come up with a zillion of them, so
10 7
I don't need to.'
On the other hand, in Shaw v. Lindheim, the Ninth Circuit found substantial
10 8
similarity between characters in a case involving writer/producer Lou Shaw.
Shaw wrote an unproduced pilot script that the court found had been infringed
' °
by the defendant's television show, "The Equalizer. '""
The court described the
lead characters in both works as someone who works outside of the law
enforcement system, is well educated, wealthy, has expensive tastes, and whose
main mission is to equalize the odds for his underdog clients."0 The court went
on to state that the most striking similarity between the characters is their "selfassuredness, and unshakable faith in the satisfactory outcome of any difficult
situation.'. While recognizing that some of these traits were generic to a
number of literary characters, the court stated that "[a]lthough James Bond may
have the Equalizers' demeanor and the Ghostbusters may have their penchant for
unpopular assignments, the totality of similarities between the two characters goes
beyond the necessities of the 'Equalizer' theme and belies any claim of literary
accident.. '" 2 Shaw shows that even if a character is composed of mainly stock or
generic elements, a sufficient number or the right combination of those elements
can lead to a finding of infringement.
While there is no specific test on how to compare two characters, one very
practical way to do so is by examining character background, personal attributes,
and motivation."'
Courts are quick to loathe plaintiffs who try to prove
infringement through laundry lists of similarities, especially where the lists
"emphasize random similarities scattered throughout the works.""' 4 These lists
are considered inherently subjective and unreliable."' However, when courts
analyze and compare characters, they can very easily fall into this same trap.
Often, courts seem drawn to focus on personal attributes because these

106 Telephone
107

Interview with Stephen J. Cannell, Writer/Producer (Sept. 20, 2002).

id

" His best known credits include "Columbo," "Six Million Dollar Man," and "Barnaby Jones."
919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990).

"9 Shaw v. Lindheirn,
110 Id at 1357-58.
".. Id
112

at 1358.

Id at 1363.

"3

Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm't, 193 F.3d 1241, 1258 (11th Cir. 1999).

4 Olson v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1450 (9th Cir. 1988).
115 Id
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characteristics are more flashy and jump off the page. While personal attributes
are critical, they are not the end all. Background and motivation are also
important because they tell a court where a character has been and where he is
trying to go. A well-rounded analysis considers all three elements. For example,
in Her:Zog v. Castle Rock Entertainment,the court was called upon to compare two
lead characters, both small town cops on the U.S./Mexican border." 6 First, the
court examined the background of the two characters. Marty, the plaintiff's
character, was a big city cop who returned to her hometown after she cost the life
of a child kidnap victim." 7
In contrast, Sam, the defendant's character, is the elected sheriff of Rio
County and son of the former sheriff, a local legend." 8 The personal attributes
of the two differ as well. Marty's primary personal attribute is the self-doubt
caused by the accident at her previous job."' On the other hand, Sam's major
personal attribute is his resentment of living in his father's shadow." Finally, the
major motivations are different. In both screenplays, Marty and Sam are
investigating murders. Marty's motivation is to exorcize the demons of her last
Sam, investigating a
job and prove she can still be an effective police officer.'
forty year old murder in which his father may be implicated, is motivated to learn
the truth about his father.122
By focusing on the "big three" of character background, personal attributes,
and motivation, courts can both cut to the heart of character similarity and
provide an organized way to approach its analysis. Moreover, cases like Zambito,
Olson, and Shaw are illustrative of where the line between idea and expression lies
when examining those three elements.
V. PLOT
Plot is defined as the plan of events in a screenplay.In It is the arrangement
of ideas and that arrangement of ideas amounts to expression.' 24 Like all the
other concrete elements of a screenplay, proving substantial similarity in plot
hinges upon the idea/expression dichotomy. Plot, more than any other element
of a screenplay, triggers most copyright infringement suits. A plaintiff sees a

116 Het

oqg193 F.3d at 1258.

117 I
118 I

119 Id
120

I

121

Hen~og, 193 F.3d at 1258.

Id.
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 772 (Encyclopedic ed. 1989).
124See STRONG, rupra note 19, at 22.
122

123
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movie with an overall idea similar to his script, and immediately believes he has
been wronged. Consequently, it falls to the courts to draw that line between
unprotectable generality in plot and concrete expression.
In Berkic v. Crichton, the court compared the plaintiffs script "Reincarnation"
to the defendant's movie "Coma." ' s First, the court looked at the most general
level of plot similarity: both scripts concerned the basic and unprotectable idea
of criminal organizations that murder healthy young people, remove their organs,
and sell them to rich old people in need of transplants." 6 Second, the court
moved to the next level of specificity: both works took their story from the
adventures of a young professional who courageously investigates and exposes the
criminal activity.12 Once again, this was considered a "vague, abstracted idea of
a general plot."'" At the third level of specificity, the court found no substantial
similarity. The plaintiff's doctor is a dupe of the criminal conspiracy for most of
the movie, whereas the defendant's doctor starts investigating early on when her
best friend falls victim to the organization during a routine surgical procedure. 29
Moreover, there was a major romantic relationship in the plaintiff's script and not
one in the defendant's."' The court seemingly employed an abstractions test to
find the level where it felt expression parted from idea.'
Additionally, case law shows that courts will find a lack of substantial plot
similarity based in part on omission. When a novelist sued the producers of the
Eddie Murphy film "Coming to America" for infringement, the plaintiff argued
the court should disregard the second major plot in her novel that was absent in
the film.'
The plaintiff maintained the second plot was irrelevant because
Paramount Pictures had only appropriated the romantic plot of her novel.'33 In
rejecting this approach, the court stated that "the existence of the second plot is
relevant because it greatly influences the mood of the book. '""M Likewise,
carefully developed subplots that appear in the defendant's work but3not in the
plaintiff's, can weigh heavily against a finding of substantial similarity.'
12sBerkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 787 (9th Cir. 1985).
126

Id at 1293.

127 Im
128 IdJ

129 Id
130

Berkic,761 F.2d at 1293.

See ako Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm't, 193 F.3d 1241,1259 (showing by defendant that a plot
about a murder investigation which reveals the corrupt past of a small town is also familiar to the
131

works of Faulkner and the movie "Chinatown").
132

Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 461, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1762 (11th Cir.

1994).
133 I
134 Id

131See

Hervg, 193 F.3d at 1259-60.
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On the other hand, the court in Shaw did find substantial similarity in plot.
First, the plot of the pilot episodes of both Shaw's script and the actual show
concerned a criminal organization that blackmails a candidate for public office. 36
In and of itself, this is an unprotectable idea much like the organ harvesting
scheme in Berki. Second, in both Equalizer scripts the organizations attempt to
kill a person who has discovered their operation. 3 That person then turns to the
Equalizer for help.t3 Once again, this is too general of an idea, comparable to the
young doctors investigating the criminal conspiracy in Berkic. However, at the
third level of examination, the court found a wide variety of similarities, including
the Equalizer's initial meeting with the client being interrupted by a shoot-out
with henchmen, the Equalizer appearing uninvited at a party dressed in a tuxedo,
the Equalizer's confrontation with the candidate/blackmail victim after a
campaign speech, the thwarting of the criminal conspiracy and the Equalizer's
subsequent rush to save a female client, and the candidate/blackmail victim's
withdrawal from the political race.139 The court freely admits that while none of
these plot elements may be remarkably distinct in and of themselves, the plots
share a common sequence or rhythm." Defining a plot as a sequence of events
through which an author expresses his idea, the court found a pattern that was
concrete enough to make a finding of substantial similarity. 4' Shaw is important
for the proposition that even scenes that are not unique or well-defined can be
substantially similar if they unfold in a similar way or pattern within the two
scripts. But, that pattern must be sufficiently concrete to avoid the doctrine of
scenes afaire.
The doctrine of scenes afaire is one of the biggest impediments a plaintiff
faces when trying to show substantial similarity in plot. Scenes afaire are those
stock elements and sequences that naturally flow from a common plot or genre. 42
Any similarities are inherent in the situation and therefore are unprotectable"'
The classic example given is the lack of protection in police fiction for "drunks,
prostitutes, vermin and derelict cars" and "foot chases and the morale problems
of policemen, not to mention the familiar figure of the Irish cop."'" The doctrine

136 Shaw,

919 F.2d at 1362-63.

137 id
138 id
139

Id

140id

Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1363.
Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 459 (11th Cir. 1994).
141HOWELL, spra note 42, at 38.
144 Beal,20 F.3d at 459. See Evans v. Wallace Berrie & Co., 681 F. Supp. 813, 817,7 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1659 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (holding that "such similarities as using a sand dollar as currency, foods
made of seaweed, seahorses for transportation and plates made of oyster or mother of pearl are not
141
4
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is predicated on a belief that "when the common idea is treated, no matter how
differently, common elements must emerge in the two works." 4 Ultimately,
courts struggle to balance the need between protecting original expression and
recognizing that sometimes similarity in expression necessarily results "from the
fact that the common idea is only capable of expression in a more or less
stereotyped form."' 46
First, a court is going to look at a script's central premise or idea. Since ideas
are not copyrightable, neither are the elements that naturally flow from them. In
Weygand v. CBS, Inc., the court was called upon to evaluate two scripts which both
concerned African-American farmers who take in a white child in a white
community during the Depression." 7 The court found that given the shared
general plot of a black farmer taking in a white child, it was not surprising that
both works had scenes showing individuals making racist comments to the boy,
the boy struggling with racism, denying the relationship, and later accepting it, the
boy assisting the farmer in the field, the farmer promising the farm to the boy
after the farmer is gone, and the farmer near death, with the boy's reaction."'
Furthermore, because both works take place in a rural area during the Depression,
the court did not find it unusual that the sheriff would play a central role in both
scripts. 49 All of these scenes and plot devices naturally flowed from the general
and unprotectable idea of a black farmer taking in a white child during the
Depression. Similarly, in Arden v. Columbia PicturersIndustries,Inc., the court found
that any similarities were scenes afaire and therefore not deserving of copyright
protection.'5 s Both the plaintiffs novel and the defendant's film "Groundhog
Day" deal with a man trapped in a repeating day.' Specifically, the court cited
scenes of the respective protagonists waking up each day at the exact same time
to the sound of an alarm clock, the protagonists both seeking medical/psychiatric
help, and the use of knowledge gained in previous repetitions of the day to their
advantage, as necessary aspects of the situation of a man trapped in a repeating
2
5

day.1

protected similarities of expression, but are more accurately characterizations that flow naturally from
the common theme of an underwater civilization").
145HOWELL, .rupranote 42, at 38.
'4

Id at 39.

Weygand v. CBS, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10613, at *28, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1120
(C.D. Cal. 1997).
"7

141

Id at *20.

149 Id

" Arden v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 908 F. Supp. 1248, 1260, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1104
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
151Id
152

at 1249.
Id at 1262.
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A plaintiff seeking to prove substantial similarity in plot has a number of
potential landmines in his path. Many plaintiffs can show similarity in the same
broad idea, and even similarity at the next level of abstraction, the same
generalized manner in which that idea unfolds (i.e., a young doctor investigating
the organ harvesting scheme in Berkic). The third level of abstraction is usually
where the rubber meets the road. Often, a defendant's work is more complex
than the plaintiff's, containing a second or third major plot or subplot that the
plaintiff's screenplay lacks. On the other hand, courts are also quick to cite a
plaintiff's script that is more developed or complex than the defendant's as
evidence of no substantial similarity. If a plaintiff's overdeveloped or underdeveloped script will be a loser, finding the three little bears "just right" formula
appears to be a very difficult task (backed up by the fact that the vast number of
these kinds of suits are losers). Moreover, even if a plaintiff can show a common
idea and substantial similarity in how a plot unfolds, a court may find that most
of the scenes are scenes afaire that naturally flow from an unprotectable idea.
Furthermore, differences in the traits and personalities of the major characters
operating in a substantially similar plot may be enough for the infringer to escape
liability. More likely than not, a plaintiff will step on one of these landmines and
find himself broken and bloodied on the battlefield of substantial similarity.
VI. MOOD
The mood of a screenplay is a combination of the tone and feel of the work.
It is certainly influenced by plot and theme, but stands separately as its own
concrete element of expression. Just because mood is nbt as substantive as
character or plot does not mean that a court should pay it short shrift. In fact,
when a jury is employing the Krfft extrinsic test, mood should play an important
role in determining if the defendant's work appropriated the same "total concept
and feel" of the plaintiff's script. For instance, in Zambito v. ParamountPictures
Corporation,the court compared the mood of the plaintiff's screenplay "Black
Rainbow" to the Lawrence Kasdan penned "Raiders of the Lost Ark."' 3 The
court described "Black Rainbow" as a "somber, vulgar script replete with overt
sexual scenes, cocaine smuggling and cold-blooded killing" whereas "Raiders" was
a "tongue-in-cheek, action-packed, Jack Armstrong, all-American adventure
story."'" Likewise, in Herqog v. Castle Rock Entertainment, the court found no

's3

Zambito, 613 F. Supp. at 1108.

Id at 1111. See alro Overman v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 350,353 (C.D. Cal.
1984) (describing defendant's script as light-hearted and sentimental while plaintiff's was earthy and
sometimes violent); Arden v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1248, 1260 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (characterizing plaintiff's script as dark and introspective whereas defendant's work was a
's
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substantial similarity in mood.'55 Both scripts involved small town police officers
investigating a murder. s The court characterized the plaintiff's script as a
straight up action-adventure/thriller with a serious mood.5 7 This is due largely
to the fact that the protagonist's life is in danger from the very beginning of the
film.' s8 On the other hand, the court found very little action and/or adventure
in the defendant's script, as the protagonist's life is never in danger and there is
neither violence nor threat of violence portrayed as he carries out his investigation.5 9 More importantly, the court found the defendant's script to be largely
character and relationship driven, leading the court to describe it as "more
thoughtful and reflective than tension-filled. '"I °
Courts certainly need to pay more attention to mood in determining
substantial similarity. Mood is often overlooked because it usually is a function
of a script's plot and theme, which are more readily apparent and easier to
characterize. While there is some overlap between mood and theme, each
element stands on its own accord.
VII. THEME
A movie's theme is its underlying message. It can usually be summed up in a
few words. The plot is the brick and mortar that lays the theme's foundation. A
theme is not tangible like a specific scene or line of dialogue, but rather an
intuitive statement that a script or movie makes about life or society in general.
Themes are important in copyright infringement suits because two screenplays
may have similar plots or characters, but use those devices to express totally
different parables.
In Sega/v. ParamountPictures,the plaintiff alleged that his script "Star Trek IV:
Inside the Klingon Empire" was infringed by the defendant's movie "Star Trek

traditional romantic comedy); Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454,461 (11th Cir. 1994)
(holding plaintiff's work was serious with few light overtones while defendant's was the
quintessential light romantic comedy); Anderson v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1, 2,226
U.S.P.Q. 131 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (coining one script as a social comedy and the other as a romantic
melodrama). But see Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353,1363 (9th Cir. 1990) (describing both works
as fast-paced, with ominous and cynical moods that are lightened by the Equalizer's victory).
However, the court found these similarities common to many action adventure series and did not
weigh them heavily in its analysis. Id
155 He: og, 193 F.3d at 1260.
156

Id

157 I

1saId
159 Id
160 Her:,g, 193

F.3d at 1260.
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VI: The Undiscovered Country.' 161 According to the court, the plaintiffs
screenplay is "a story of territorial aggrandizement which fuels violent confrontation among the nations. 1 62 In contrast, the "Undiscovered Country" is a tale of
efforts of enemy empires to "beat swords into plowshares and to forge a
fundamentally new relationship founded on peace."' 63 While the scripts also
appear to have different plots, the court concentrated on the irreconcilable
thematic difference between the two works. Although set in the twenty-third
century, the court believed that the defendant's film was a metaphor for the end
of the Cold War.'" It expressed a new vision of glasnost and peaceful relations
among former enemies. 16 The plaintiff's script expressed a vastly different
theme, one premised on prejudice toward an enemy and "the concomitant need
to relate to those 'others' through war."' 66 The themes of the two works are polar
opposites of each other and go a long way toward disproving any substantial
similarity.167
Similarly, in Herog v. Castle Rock Entertainment,the court found significant
thematic differences.' 6 While acknowledging that both scripts shared the basic
theme of the past having the power to influence the present, the court stated that
"this truism is not entitled to copyright protection."169
The court went on to find that the theme of the plaintiffs script "Concealed"
was about the protagonist putting past demons to rest in order to regain her selfconfidence. 7 ° "Lone Star," the defendant's movie/screenplay, views the past
from different racial perspectives and employs those perspectives to examine
contemporary questions involving how morality and prejudice influence identity
and love.'' Hen~og is a good illustration of the idea/expression dichotomy at

161 Segal v. Paramount Pictures, 841 F. Supp. 146,147-48,29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1949 (E.D. Pa.
1993). The plaintiff submitted his script in 1983, when "Star Trek" was gearing up for its fourth
installment, but the suit actually alleges that the sixth movie in the series, released in 1991, was the
one that infringed upon his screenplay. Id
162 Id at 149.
163 Id

164

Id.

Segal, 841 F. Supp. at 149 (noting that when the plaintiff wrote his screenplay, the end of the
Cold War was still years away).
165

166 Id

193 F.3d at 1259. Bmtsee Robinson v. New Line Cinema Corp., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6848,
at *6-7, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1150, 1152 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding the same "overriding theme of
violent retaliation against the perceived socioeconomic and racial injustices of society, as experienced
by a group of predominantly lower-income black women").
'8 Hero g, 193 F.3d at 1259.
169 id
167

170 Id
171

id
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work in the thematic setting. While both scripts share the same generalized theme
of the past influencing the present, the expression of that theme is not substantially similar.
While there is some overlap between plot, theme, and mood, each is a separate
and unique element of expression that deserves indvidual analysis. However,
theme in particular seems to be a good tool to separate similar plots from each
other. It is very unlikely that two scripts are going to be able to have substantially
similar plots, yet maintain substantially different themes. Most likely, if the two
themes are substantially different, the plot similarities are probably not concrete
and consist of only the same generalized idea. Consequently, theme acts as its
own concrete element yet also serves as a benchmark to gauge the idea/expression dichotomy during plot analysis.
VIII. THE MINOR ELEMENTS
Of the eight concrete elements of expression that courts compare, some can
best be characterized as minor elements. Generally, these elements receive less
weight than character, plot, theme, or mood. Moreover, the minor elements
usually do not have independent significance and are mainly relevant to help
substantiate similarities in the more substantive categories.
Setting is one such minor element. Geographic settings can be easily changed
and most script thieves have enough common sense to do so. However, there are
exceptions that prove the rule. For instance, the producers of the film "Jaws"
' 72
successfully sued the makers of a knock-off movie entitled "Great White.'
Both movies were centered around small coastal towns on the Atlantic seaboard
being attacked by killer sharks. 73 In that case however, setting was an important
part of the overall plot and just one example of a larger pattern of infringement.
Generally speaking, geographic setting itself is not going to be a protectable
element of expression.7 4 In a case involving the film "Groundhog Day,"
differences in geographic setting spoke to larger differences in plot and theme.
While the plaintiffs novel was set in New York City, "Groundhog Day" was set
The small town served a
in Punxsutawney, a small town in Pennsylvania.'
aggravated by the
was
particularly
comedic function, as the Bill Murray character
76
Of course,
heaven.Y
stuck
in
hick
celebrity
fact that he was a big-city television

172

Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Film Ventures Int'l, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 1134, 214 U.S.P.Q.

(BNA) 865 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
"I Id at 1136.
174See Sinicola v. Warner Bros., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1176, 1189 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (holding that
setting in New York City was not a protectable element of expression).
175 Arden v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1248, 1262 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
176 Id
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setting is not limited to the geographic location of a story. Courts also analyze
setting in terms of where specific scenes occur in a screenplay. This analysis is
often beneficial to a defendant trying to disprove substantial similarity. For
example, in Beal v. Paramount Pictures, the court compared two scripts about
wealthy African princes who come to America.' 7 In the plaintiff's script, the
prince has modest but comfortable living quarters in a pleasant neighborhood
near Georgia Tech University.' The defendant's prince lives in a slum apartment
(recently vacated due to the previous tenant's murder) in an extremely run-down
area of Queens.'79 This is played for comedic effect and helps to spotlight the
fish-out-of-water story line whereas the living quarters in the plaintiff's script
serves no particular function. In addition, plaintiffs often provide a laundry list
of settings common to both scripts (i.e., both scripts have scenes that take place
in restaurants, theaters, bars, etc.). Without more concrete and specific similarity
of dialogue or plot within those settings, courts will dismiss the settings as generic
and uncopyrightable. Furthermore, if the settings naturally flow from a common
theme, they will be dismissed under the scenes afaire doctrine.
Similarly, pace is a minor element. By itself, pace has no independent
significance. Two scripts would never be found substantially similar just because
they were both fast-paced or slow and plodding. Furthermore, pace is often a
function of the genre of a story. For example, in both Shaw and Olson, the court
found that a fast pace was common to the genre of an action-adventure television
show and therefore not an actionable similarity 8 0 Usually, pace is most effective
when analyzed in tandem with plot or another major element. In Herog, the
court said that although the defendant's story occurs over a two day period, the
pace was slow and stately."" This was largely a result of the film's mood, which
was "more thoughtful and reflective than tension-filled."' 82 While the plaintiff's
script also took place over a couple day period, the court described it as "rapid
and tense."'8 3 The differences in pace made it easier to delineate one script as a
character driven drama and the other as a thriller.
Additionally, sequence of events, while recognized as one of the eight concrete
elements, falls on the minor side of the line. This is not because sequence of
events is unimportant. Quite the contrary, two scripts that share the exact same
sequence of events are probably defacto substantially similar. The reason why
sequence of events is a minor element is because courts often lump analysis of it
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in with plot. Clearly, there is a lot of overlap between the two elements. Courts
reject efforts of plaintiffs to juxtaposition scenes occurring at different points in
two works to show a sequence of events."8 A sequence of events is just that-an
extended sequence of identical or nearly identical scenes. Consequently, if both
scripts share an extended sequence of events, those events are most likely being
used to further a similar plot. However, sequence of events can naturally flow
from a story. For example, all works involving courtship and marriage will feature
a wedding, usually near the end of the story."' 5
Finally, the remaining concrete element courts compare is dialogue. Dialogue
is not normally considered a minor element. In fact, substantial similarity in
dialogue would likely be a smoking gun that does a defendant in. For the
purposes of this Note, dialogue is examined under the minor elements because
there is a surprising lack of analysis of it in the case law. The absence in dialogue
analysis could be due to a couple of reasons. First, courts may just find it too
tedious in the limited confines of an opinion to compare and contrast every line
of remotely similar dialogue. Second, defendants may also realize directly copying
dialogue is a smoking gun and are therefore more likely to infringe upon the other
elements of a screenplay. Furthermore, similarities in dialogue are often dismissed
as uncopyrightable. Ordinary phrases are not copyrightable and any copying must
amount to a "sequence of creative expression."' 6 A romance novelist was not
found to have infringed upon the plaintiff's historical work even though both
authors described a group of family relationships as a "staggering network," a
muddy street as a "cow path," and a group of treasure hunters as "hordes of gold
seekers."187 These phrases were considered ordinary and not infringing.'88 In
addition, any dialogue that flows from a common theme will not be protected. 8 9
Once ordinary phrases and scenes afairedialogue are removed from the equation,
showing an extended sequence of creative expression can be a difficult challenge.
Of course, dialogue does not occur in a vacuum. In a lawsuit involving the
dreadfully contrived film "Jingle All the Way," both the plaintiff's and defendant's
script concerned workaholic/absentee fathers battling frantically on Christmas
Eve to find the season's hottest toy for their son.' 9 Feeling guilty about not
being able to find the toy, in both scripts the father breaks into a toy store, finds
the toy, suddenly stops, then reflectively asks, "what am I doing" before returning
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the item. 9' While "what am I doing" is surely an ordinary saying, it was part of
a larger sequence that went to the heart of the story.'92 Even though that specific
line of dialogue was not concrete enough to deserve protection, it was part of an
overall sequence that helped to show substantial similarity.

IX. CONCLUSION
Screenwriter Daniel Waters 93 once said the screenplay is "the most fragile art
form there is, the one with the most perilous journey from cocoon to
butterfly."' 94 That being said, many who believe their script has been stolen are

victims of synchronicity, not plagiarism. 9 ' Synchronicity is the writer's shadow,
that crushing blow when "our enthusiasm in a concept, story, or screenplay [is]
dashed because someone got there minutes ahead of us.' ' 196 It can be very hard

for a writer to admit that this is just coincidence, not the result of skullduggery.
Veteran writer/producer Stephen J. Cannell agrees:
Very often, you have a novice writer not in the business. They
finally put pen to paper thinking this is going to be their big break,
their lottery ticket. When they see a movie or show even remotely
similar to their script, the writer convinces themselves that they've
been taken. They want to believe it's true so badly.'97
For those screenwriters who have legitimately been the target of copyright
infringement, proving it in a court of law is an onerous task. First, a plaintiff must
successfully clear the access hurdle. When a screenwriter has directly given his
script to the alleged infringer, that is not difficult to do. However, when there is
a direct chain of people between the writer and the infringer, courts often confuse
a defendant's reasonable opportunity to see the plaintiff's work with an actual
opportunity to do so. While courts will infer access based upon a close
relationship between an intermediary given the script and the alleged infringer,
most courts define "close" so narrowly as to make the inference meaningless.
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Furthermore, the rise of the Internet as a screenwriting tool is likely to complicate
the situations where that chain is not so clear. If courts are willing to adopt an
access theory based upon wide dissemination of a work into the public domain
(such as a television broadcast, novel, or song played on the radio), courts must
do the same for scripts that are widely accessible to the public on the Internet.
Ultimately, courts must get back to their primary duty: determining copying via
substantial similarity in concrete expression.
There is no bright line which tells a court how much substantial similarity in
expression is needed to show infringement. Generally, a plaintiff is going to need
a combination of many different concrete elements to prove his case.""8 While
substantial similarity in plot alone may be enough to show infringement, character
may have to be coupled with theme and mood to prove a case. As long as a
plaintiff can pass the extrinsic test by showing substantial similarity among some
combination of the eight elements, it is ultimately going to fall to a jury to
determine if the total concept and feel of the two works are the same.
Lest a plaintiff never forget, the idea/expression dichotomy is the elephant
always present in the room. The idea/expression dichotomy courses through
every facet of a screenplay and is a tremendous obstacle to conquer. Simply put,
"in Hollywood, as in the life of men generally, there is only rarely anything new
under the sun."'" Ideas, as well as expression that naturally flows from a
common idea, are not copyrightable.
At the end of the day, a writer can take a number of steps to protect himself.
Registering a screenplay with the Writers Guild of America or with the U.S.
Copyright Office is a good start." In addition, a writer should keep a detailed
paper trail of when and to whom they submitted their screenplay."° Finally, a
writer should make sure his or her personality is stamped on every page of a
script.2 2 The more distinct a screenplay is, the harder it will be for a thief to
misappropriate it. Of course, a screenwriter cannot spend all his time worrying
about whether or not he is going to be stolen from. If you never put yourself out
there, you will never have a chance to succeed either.
NICK GLADDEN
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